

) "A Change of Heart" & Limerick Action, Jan 82


- group:
- (Barrett: write a personal letter to a friend, or a writer's audience: sign a petition, start a group, send letters...)
 - Mother in film: "My son said to me, 'Mother, I haven't asked you for much. I want you to do this for me.' (got arrested)"

Our Chamberlain: "How do banks explain: Wf Pershing II?"

MBG: Some people have been out in PSR — "Too depressing — we know about people's skin coming off like a sleeve."

- war that is coming
- This war (- to-come) would not only to be resisted; it remains to be understood.

To work to abstract + postpone its approach, we can't wait for better understanding; But if we are to



[To oppose national sovereignty is to oppose the remaining locus of legitimate violence
➤ (not to scatter its monopoly).

[cf. Jonaki, on widening identity...]

[Does "pseudo-speciation" mean that species feel a need to exterminate each other; but that one is permitted...
(to "murder/kill" the other...)]

CM, (not MX, though some form of boxing...)
threatens verifiability

panel on nuclear war of Am. Psychol. Soc.

MBG

"There is really only one disease — a sense of helplessness."

[NO - This model does not explain why Pres/DOD designs and buys the weapons it does; or what he will do; or what he will refuse to do (or insist on doing) against great opposition, public argument, at cost + risk...

Nor what does do...

Why MM-III, MK12A?

Why SS-18/19 mod 4? *

* Hyp: Maybe SU, too, preferred both to have a CF cap, than neither. Hence, no great incentive to MIRV, or many testy: or MX!

Maybe both accept inevitability + desirability of NK's world in which "both sides have Type II Det against major provocation (because of mutual possession of prompt cap.)

Barrett: "Even before we weapons, we had ceased to serve the interests states. & WWI..."

[NO - US; i.e. WWI and WWII...

that was our school!

[NOT "mimic" but the positive lessons of WWII - what is permissible, what we can do for us... "The lessons of that bombing, of Tokyo, of Hiroshima..."

"Must devalue our weapons; and delegitimize war.
"Must see our weapons as doing the more harm than good..." [Is this like 'slavery': moral problem?
Was it true that

[Is there a white-man or white-initiated movement that has brought out black leaders or activists?]

Frage, US/SU

>>>> -Drill, 9 Jan 83

John Dennis: Says some little interest in a Frage, now;
would not change he has 3 years from now.
after both sides have tested for 3 years.

[But are we ahead in accuracy] technology?
Whellon — ~ (50-50?) even?
(“Says test now...”)

He claimed: SS-18 has accuracy of MX, now:
(i.e. They are ahead! Lie.)
If not, the testing is as easy to cut off
3 years from now, as now.

All public statements (Ball) claim ^{latest}
MX is twice the accuracy of MM II ~ SS-18/19.

2) Whellon: bias is no problem: smaller than CEP.

(non reg. Carlson issue is: Is it ^{large} ~~small~~
enough as an increment of uncertainty to have
a critical effect on SSKP? for SSUs, for MX
Major difference between 200 + 250, or even 100-150
is not critical.

“Barin is wrong on this, has exaggerated; and has conceded this.” (?)

“RG doesn’t decide on a basis of physics.”

b) We do have satellites on low polar (ballistic-type) orbits
giving adequate data on gravitational anomalies.

Whellon

(c) We favor a (bilateral) cutoff of all missile testing.

[Does he really believe R shares his “view”
on the urgency of getting rid of all FS/CF weapons,
on both sides? Is it a ‘dumb error’ that START never does that?

Bell: See Winter 1992/83

1. McN's Am Arbor speech, originally addressed to NATO officials, refers to objectives "in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major [non-nuclear] attack on the Alliance", refers primarily to a US FS.

This is obscure to an American audience (it combines Types I + II Dist artfully);

which would not only not realize NATO plans and FS plans, but would not realize what a change it implies, to avoid cities and constraints on military forces.

[My BNSP supposes doing so even when SU strikes US ^{first} — even if SU does hit cities, or ~~is~~ might do so (warheads not yet having arrived).

This is not in itself (much of) an encouragement to a US FS, since SU would (presumably; in my mind, April '61) have actually, 1961-64!) have the capability and the probable intention to hit US cities anyway.

But the Am Arbor speech is in the context of a US FS, of circumstances in which the US is committed to launch a FS, and proposes to present a more rational, more promising strategy for carrying out that commitment: thus, not criticizing or suggesting a departure from the commitment itself — as my 1968 NATO speech does — but rather, sustaining it (against a Gaullist alternative).

schlesinger-type
2. CF attacks ~~including~~ LSW — are intended to
"deter 'limited nuclear attacks' —
esp., SU retal to US FU!

and this, to be a substitute, also, for conventional military
ops (e.g. US reps to SU conventional attacks, or SU
support to an ally (who may be under US or US allied
attack: e.g. SU support to Egypt, under attack by Israel).

1973

Samt: We are like the drunk who seizes upon
the product that is (Experimentally) his insurance on
the solution

"Sophistication" is approving our reduction by
adding 37,000 new nuclear weapons.

"Simplistic" reasoning: "Enough is enough."

There is no technological solution to seeing problem
raised by atomic weapons.

[No improvement? No]

Oct 82

Gallup Poll: 47% think nuclear war is likely (?)
within 5 years: the chance of winning
even less than 50:50.

Reagan is ally of peace movement: his honesty about
his views ... brought several million into streets, in Europe &
World peace movement.

[At time Dept. of War changed name to Dept of Defense,
"defense" became impossible

"T.K. Jones, R. broke through traditional public assumption
that gov leaders knew what they were doing."

[No. They do. They are not doing what they
said they would, as candidates; or what they now
say they are doing, or have done; or what we would
want them to do, "if we knew what they know (and
what we know!)]

NO

~~But~~ But what arms controllers see as good weapons
are seen by technologists as bad; "arms control" proved
process was smarter, now under control, than it was. (NO)

5 Jan 83

"By Any Means Necessary" ... (inc. War ... Means ... as "last resort")

(Carter Doctrine: after Afghan ... and from hostages
(and Shah, Sonoya...))

Under some circumstances, this, promise, or
warning, or threat, is ^{hard} to make credible;
such as, when it was uttered by Black Power
advocates — rejecting non-violence —
(and Gandhian principles: Means and Ends
are indistinguishable)

Sufficiently
"crazy"—
reckless

and of the Black Panthers. (see Cleaver: "I am free.")

By carrying guns openly, and by attacking police,
they did make it credible they would "defend
themselves — if any means necessary." (But that was not a threat...)
("I'm on parole...")

Of course, this led to their being wiped out —
promptly.

Black Power — conceived as Violent Power —
did bring about certain changes, inspired pride &
recruitment — mainly, annihilation.

(We want the kind of Revolution that can only
be achieved non-violently; inc. rev. against
violence.)

See Nicaragua: USG says its aim is to "increase
the costs" to the FSLN of supporting rev in El Salvador
(and defying US in general).

But violence changes more than the "calculation
of costs" — the hearts & minds of the victim!

Perception of needs, of threats, of desires (including
revenge; "independence — respect — "strength..."); loyalty,
and for allies; priorities; acceptable means —
as well as tendency to "calculate," to accept risks —

discuss, power
to harm causes

Fear, escalation,
perception

Thus: Spent's
fear of
Others' growing
power.

"FA Article"

"Delicate Balance of Power,"

Imbalance. (which R wants to regain)

Not "delicate" (at least, persistent:
20 years; no more)

(Notion of "no new arms
1965 or 1970 ignores
MIRV, accuracy, and
improving US developments
in CM, Trident (accuracy,
long-range, MIRV)
ASW)

ASW arguments against IRBMs in 1958
now apply to land-based missiles:
MM, P, CM.

By supporting Type II, they undercut
Type I, requiring compensation; but
this compensation is unrealistic in a crisis,
because it is hard to know intentions
to promptly attack, without many
unreliable weapons (especially CP weapons).
(to eliminate opponents' intention to
remove the volatility).

Show conflicts between types of "deterrence"

Also — show dynamic effects and
interactive effects of "deterrence" (in
Type I) over time.

Show actual US policy; AND IGNORANCE OF
IT BY PEOPLE AT RAND & LIVERMORE, who

accept (unintentionally, self-serving)
common stories of "2nd strike D-C," or ~~hypothetical~~
~~threats~~, as sole rationale for vast expenses
that would have only marginal, problematic
effects in a 2nd strike; who admit to
"appearance of FS cap" as accidental,
negotiable, unavoidable.

just like stuff when IV was behind
he was "getting out."

"Do MM now contribute to Type I
deterrence — on balance? If Type I were
our only objective, would we not remove
them (or bargain them away — (e.g. US SS-18/19?))
(Would SS-18s be a major threat
with no MMs?)"

What could R "get" by ~~reducing~~
~~removing~~ MM-Mk IIs as well as forcing
new developments?

on both sides
[Past developments have brought us to
a point where Type I Det is not
detracted — even against large SV force —
esp even in ASW

which can be maintained by
restrictions on ASW ops & weapons.

|| (Restrictions on ASW favor US w/t mode of
Western shipping, non-mutual conflict!
NORPAT West for FS!)

NORPAT

BARKER

Barker: There is essential equilibrium between
US/SC — it is a propitious time for arms control
talks with SC, and

Admiral seems to think it unlikely ^{US} pop will both
engage in arms control talks and support efforts to

... if you favor arms control, you must oppose
efforts to

SC active to negate our "defense" cap. [not ^{offering} our total
cap — that is not
"fragile" (subs)]

X SC has an active ASW program

"Somewhat such story of MX ...

● (best) sides can't come up with any way to
protect it that makes sense

X MX should not come into existence till it
can be made invulnerable

"parity is dynamic"

Freeze is 8 years away

[PROPOSE ... verification ...

[What of FU? Under what circs ...

if SC was at point where it could detect
& deploy Trident

"Arm while talk" ... or, endless race ...

Freeze "danger to conf" — greater than unconstrained ...

of NFO

Prolif (Japan & Germany...)

[MM]

wf not
dismantle

MXI

"not promising enough... so they put the in final sales

US FS cap: "preposterous..."

[EU has center regiments ...]

"SU has 75% in land-based systems

"looks like FS system ...

SUB "FRAGILITY"

SS-18s are real [MX is "figment of imagination"]

Worry about Sovs ... [FS]

[SU will break if ...]

How get Trident (I) without getting

II, MX, P, CM, N

AND SOV LIKEWISE?

Possibility vs. P/CM

Am would (only) about SU ASW cap. ...

SALT-II now — 8 yrs to freeze

D

sub/ASW

- 1) Disturbance of the attack is not
fragile [except in practice it]
— this we could afford to STOP — while —
talking

- 2) (Euro - balance Poseidon)

"Paradoxes" (= light of Reagan warnings + claimed air + nuclear)

"Answers"

- (1) Why Reagan has postponed any attempt to close the "US window of vulnerability" in 1983-85 period:

Because there is no credible SU threat of proportion until there is a credible threat of US proportion! [The US does need enlarged retal force!] (A)

- (2) (It is therefore consistent with this that Reagan ignores notion of an MM-III force (which Nitze estimated would threaten 65% of SU ICBM force (i.e. much more of total alert force than SU can!))

Also, denying that US has a proportion cap. — or more importantly, — inclination yet to threaten it or use it. (B)

- (3) Also — his START proposal, which does not eliminate CF/proportion on either side! — in fact, "weakens" ("letting" from his point of view) on both! (C)

E

Van Clon, Thompson, Nitze, —
(Why, though, did Hawks press for "quick fixes" — that did not provide CF in S-R?

They exaggerate S-R SU threat; perhaps regard Nitze strategy as a preventive ^{war} ~~strategic~~ threat; (not, proportion); believe it would work;

or else, miss point that a proportion threat (not, a O-L warning) requires our own vulnerability to opponent's CF/proportion capability; and presumably, a CF/proportion doctrine, faith, threat, on part of opponent.

- (4) (Not installed — US declaratory doctrine — "for future, not now" — told PD-59, July 1980.

(5) How about: "cheap" tactics?!

"To extent that..."

"In sum that... for reasons that..."

If MM vulnerability lowers US Type I Det -
the MX-i-fuel-silos does so much,
much more!

X - What R worries about is not "wisdom of
vulnerability" from 1983 on, but
"intention of PARITY, + of "incredible" US FS cap,
starting in 1965-69."

.. Not "vulnerability" of US MM, ^{or "credibility of SU FS"}
but invulnerability of SU land-based
missiles, hence incredibility of US RU/FS
threats.

(not mirrored by SS-18/mod 4) "VULNERABILITY OF US GLOBAL INTERESTS TO NON-NUC CHALLENGE"

(The threat of US preemption - i - crisis is not
enough for US: we "need" RU threat,
and escalation threat, too: a "better" FS
threat than SU.

SU IS NOT GETTING A CREDIBLE
FS CAP (LACKING ASW; and given
C's problems, etc.)

The "need" for new weapons IS NOT RELATED
TO SS-20 OR SS-18, 19;

IT IS RELATED TO HARDENING
OF PRIOR GENERATION OF SU MISSILES
IN 1965-67 & THE LOSS (OVER A DECADE
AGO) OF CREDIBLE US FS THREAT.

What's new? Why now? Not new ^{SU} threats;
but ^{tech.} new opportunities (to restore past US
threats (a) Newly-national defiance in function
of need for US threats (after VN, Shah / Misra, ...)

SS-20 v SS-18/Mod 4

do diminish (further) US threat of
intermediate escalation.

Why

MOVEMENT?

- 1) R/Hay/Washington
- 2) End of SALT!
- 3) Weapons progress, deployment

R is worried not about the inadequacy
of US nuclear cap
but about the adequacy of the
SU nuclear cap. ...

... not about the vulnerability of the
US (land-based) nuclear cap
but about the invulnerability of the
SU nuclear cap.

not about ^{coming} credibility of SU FS threat
but the loss of credibility — a decade
ago — of US FS threat

Only now does technology allow us
to threaten, again, $\frac{2}{3}$ ^{to all} of their warheads —
[they can at most threaten $\frac{1}{3}$ of ours — CM,
Trident II, MX don't improve this, for the! the
"sad" they get ASW! Still, they can improve
"homography" (exhibitions) this purposes cap!]]

Frege

1981: "the strategic balance" that Reagan wants to restore:

200:4 50x1
3000:194 15x1

194 $\overline{) 3000}$
194
1060

"Stable" deterrence (in crisis?) is not the goal,
unstable deterrence is the effort!
(unless we "appreciate" SU FS cap., too!
as deterring us!)

- New Wave of FS weapons:

launched under Nixon, Ford (HAK, Salsus)
(late SSS: MIRV and MCN)
ABM

cruise: HAK
MIRV

1968-69 cruise steps away from "MAD":

|| Flourishing now, with increased accuracy,
as FS weapons + guided-to-target (e.g. Trident II)

Both doing it (US being started. Wanted SU have
forgone MIRV? We didn't test this;
we tested (only) weapons!

X
Now: R would rather test new weapons than
test SU (+000, etc.) willing to STOP!

(2) THE "TRIAD" HAS BECOME A DANGER, REDUCING
OUR SECURITY (GIVEN SS-18 mod -)
ESP. WITH MX IN
FIXED SILOS!

ELIMINATE EITHER 1) MM

or 2) SS-18's

or 3) MIRV (or "accuracy"?)

April 82

(nor, the anti-me moment in Europe or US)

It is not the SU that has blocked
ratification of SALT-II

(while the JCS, and Barber, regard
as desirable)

nor, a NFU-agreement, or its implementation
(END)

Nor did the SU even participate in
a grossed quantitative / partial "race"
till 1964

(nor is it true that "only" the SU did so
after 1967).

Thus, an assertion that a HALT on the basis
of parity was unattainable because of SU
resistance (or renunciation), has little or no basis.

In fact, the USG has never sought an end
to the arms build-up — on any basis other than
superiority, and never even the (1964; or, "Baruch Plan")

Our policies have assumed either overriding desirability / necessity
for continuing US modernization, and / or total impossibility of ending SU modernization.

USG POSITION HAS ALWAYS BEEN, ~~THE~~ DURING
PERIOD OF PARITY (1967 — 1982) THAT
AN END TO THE US BUILDUP WAS NON-
NEGOTIABLE, TO BE EXCLUDED FROM THE
AGENDA: EITHER TESTING, PROD OR DEPLOYMENT
BOTH A PERMANENT HALT,

AND EVEN A TEMPORARY HALT, DURING NEGOTIS
(MIRV; accuracy; MX, B-1, CM, N...)

(see present of test moratorium :

what is history of that, & breaking ?)

(Reagan's kept name, probably :¹⁾ to call for SU reduction
when US forgets new weapons : ²⁾ maneuverable, testy and
deployable while talking : like Buss-option : I.E. TOTAL HOAX

SS-8

April 28/82

(nor, the anti-me moment in Europe or US)
It is not the SU that has blocked
ratification of SALT-II
(which the JCS, and Baruch, regard
as desirable)

Nor, a NFO-agreement, or its implementation
(END)

Nor did the SU ever participate in
a genuine quantitative / functional "race"
till 1964

(nor is it true that "only" the SU did so
after 1967).

This, an assertion that a HALT on the basis
of parity was unattainable because of SU
resistance (or refusation), has little or no basis.

In fact, the USG has never sought an end
to the arms build-up — on any basis other than
superiority, and never even the (1964; or, "Baruch Plan")

Our policies have aimed either overriding denial / preventing
by containing US production, and / or total impossibility of such SU production.

USG POSITION HAS ALWAYS BEEN, THROUGHOUT DURING
PERIOD OF PARITY (1967 — 1982) THAT
AN END TO THE US BUILDUP WAS NON-
NEGOTIABLE, TO BE EXCLUDED FROM THE
AGENDA : EITHER TESTING, PROD OR DEPLOYMENT

BOTH A PERMANENT HALT,

AND EVEN A TEMPORARY HALT, DURING NEGOTIATIONS
(MIRV; accuracy; MX, B-1, CM, N...)

(see precedent of test moratorium :

what is history of that, & breaking ?)

(Reagan's next move, probably : ¹⁾ to call for SU reduction
while US forgets new weapons : ²⁾ renewable, test and
deploy while talking, like Zero-option : i.e. TOTAL HOAX SS-8

Problem: the rapidly tests & production & deployment
(P, CM, MX, Trident II, N)
are committing ²⁾ to another decade 10-15 years
of no build-up, not to FS (presumably,
essentially) (not probably FU) tests.
Munitions, ²⁾ proliferation

They can be favored — now, as urgent — only
by those who (a) want FU/FS tests to be as
credible as possible, as soon as possible
and/or (b) believe a continued arms race is
detrimental, or inevitable.

Those who hope to avert another decade
of build-up (esp. in CF/presumably) should
consider or support at least a moratorium now
(This risks nothing w.r.t. Treaty I Date, for
5-10 years; since 2) US also are ^{so} incredibly, & so
numerous; b) US is back to square one, in every
category threatening deterring: AND CAN AFFORD
TO LOSE LEAD, for fear of loss of deterring
the attacks).

Nonetheless, nuclear weapons are escalatory and
preemptive: THEIR USE IS CREDIBLE ONLY
(AS AN "OPTION")

IN CONTEXT OF AN ONGOING WAR: FOR MOST
WEAPONS, AN ONGOING NUCLEAR WAR —

I.E. THEIR USE IS "PERHAPS RATIONAL", ONLY
OR, TEMPTING TO A RATIONAL DECISION-MAKER, ONLY
IF ALTERNATIVE ("PERHAPS GREATER EVIL") IS
A MILITARY FULL OR TACTICAL DEFEAT; OR COSTLY,
PROLONGED, INDECISIVE, DESTRUCTIVE STALEMATE; OR IMPENDING
ENEMY NUCLEAR ESCALATION OR FIRST STRIKE.

It do deter "war", by enlarging its risks (for both)

2) But not totally, or adequately
see Korea, Indochina, China
Hong Kong, Czech (Afghanistan)

in period of non-US monopoly;
or US threats of EU in 1968-69-72;

despite parity;

nor an US threat in ME, or in Cuba,

certain to deter SC invasion;

NO RISKS OUTWEIGH ADVANTAGES.

6) BOTH SIDES RELIED ON THIS FEAR ~~TO~~
TO PRESERVE UNJUST, OPPRESSIVE SOCIAL ORDERS:
SC, IN EAST EUROPE (+ SC!) (to protect SC occupation
+ revolutionary forces)
US, IN THIRD WORLD (to protect US
revolutionary forces, who would)

It is probable intention for
SC revolution / revolution forces now: 55-20, 18.

McN saw all this in 1961; but on September
was so great the situation was relatively
safe + stable (though in Berlin, Cuba!
However, stakes were high; costs of abandoning
that looked great); and McN apparently
came to conclude SC would tolerate the
situation, indefinitely — so, he apparently
assumed we had longer than we did to
change policy, before it became intolerably dangerous
(now).